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SUSPENDED OVER THE ABYSS: A CITY'S
QUEST FOR LOCAL AUTONOMY IN
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LmGATION
Michelle S. Simon*
Introduction
If you choose to believe me, good. Now I will tell how Octavia,
the spider-web city, is made. There is a precipice between two steep
mountains: the city is over the void, bound to the two crests with
ropes and chains and catwalks. You walk on the little wooden ties,
careful not to set your foot in the open spaces, or you cling to the
hempen strands. Below there is nothing for hundreds and hundreds
of feet: a few clouds glide past; farther down you can glimpse the
chasm's bed.
This is the foundation of the city: a net which serves as passage
and as support. All the rest, instead of rising up, is hung below:
rope, ladders, hammocks, houses made like sacks, clothes hangers,
terraces like gondolas, skins of water, gas jets, spits, baskets on
strings, dumbwaiters, showers, trapezes and rings for children's
games, cable cars, chandeliers, pots with trailing plants.
Suspended over the abyss, the life of Octavia's inhabitants is less
uncertain than in other cities. They know the net will last only so
long.1
The city sways, suspended between two peaks: one peak repre-
sents constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; the other the city's quest for autonomy.2  When a city
violates a constitutional right, courts must address the violation
and create an effective remedy while respecting local autonomy.
The tension between these two goals causes the city to swing pre-
cariously between the mountains.
The city is a mere political subdivision of the state, "created as
[a] convenient agen[t] for exercising such of the governmental
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the thoughtful editorial suggestions of Professor Donald L.
Doernberg as well as the research assistance of Mary Storella.
1. ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES 75 (1974).
2. Issues involving local autonomy have primarily arisen in the context of the
relationship between the state and local governments, and not between the federal
and local governments. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
powers as may be entrusted to [it]."' 3 Despite its limited powers,
the city plays an integral role in our daily lives. It is the primary
protector of our homes and schools, as well as the provider of es-
sential services such as garbage collection, police and fire protec-
tion, utilities, and transportation. Moreover, the city provides for
an additional layer of democratic protection by allowing its constit-
uents to participate more directly in the political process. Democ-
racy, however, is always accompanied by the fear that the majority
will subject the minority to its will. A viable democratic system will
ensure that minority interests are protected by regulating the direct
participation process.' In the American system, the Constitution
protects the minority from the tyranny of the majority by providing
certain rights which cannot be taken away by a simple democratic
process.
Constitutional rights are abstract; the Framers prescribed them
without a detailed view of how they would apply to individual
cases.5 When a right has been violated, however, creating and en-
forcing a remedy is anything but abstract. When a city violates a
constitutional right, the court's authority to create a remedy
clashes with the city's autonomy and its ability to fashion policies
to further its objectives. If the court places too much importance
on the interests of the local government, many constitutional viola-
tions will go unremedied. 6 A fair remedy is crucial to the well be-
3. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
4. Debates focusing on the pros and cons of decentralization of power have
taken place throughout American history. For cases discussing the debates, see Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). For additional information on
these debates, see Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and
Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1993); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentral-
ization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1993); Michael Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on
Pluralism, 64 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1989); James W. Lowe, Examination of Governmen-
tal Decentralization in New York City and a New Model For Implementation, 27
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 173 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-511 (1987); Carol M. Rose, Planning
and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF.
L. REV. 837 (1983); see also Joseph M. Lynch, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority: An Alternate Opinion, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 74 (1986); D. Grier
Stephenson, Jr. & Barry M. Levine, Vicarious Federalism: The Modern Supreme
Court and the Tenth Amendment, 19 URB. LAW. 683 (1987).
5. Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 738 (1992) (arguing that today's court system, faced with a
strong popular will, selectively enforces rights that have remedies that can be imple-
mented without great offense to majoritarian values and beliefs).
6. Any attempt to reform major institutions or programs will lead to controversy
as those who are used to the status quo must readjust to a new method. If the change
is judicially ordered, it suggests that the change is already in opposition to the popular
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ing of a society because it is likely to affect important interests such
as families, homes, schools, and financial security. On the other
hand, remedies are costly, and local governments may not be able
to bear the financial or social costs without imposing a heavy bur-
den on its constituents. For that reason, courts must depend on the
cooperation and participation of the municipality and its inhabit-
ants for success in the remedial process.
The difficulty involved in protecting constitutional rights while
respecting the autonomy of the municipal government and the le-
gitimacy of majoritarian rule suspends the city over the abyss. In
an attempt to stabilize the foundation of the city, the Supreme
Court has held that district courts must consider the nature and
scope of the violation, and "the interest of state and local authori-
ties in managing their own affairs[,] ' '7 when addressing the consti-
tutional violations of municipalities. Unfortunately, this statement
offers little guidance on how district courts are to balance the com-
peting interests of preserving local autonomy and remedying con-
stitutional violations.
As a result, district courts are able to fashion any remedy they
feel is appropriate. The Court has consistently limited its role by
denying certiorari or affirming particular remedies,8 unless the
remedy is intrusive or causes a severe backlash.9 Meanwhile, the
lower federal courts have been extremely active, issuing sweeping
will, which can enhance opposition. For an illustration of this point, see infra notes
92-109 and accompanying text.
7. Millikin v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977) [hereinafter Milikin II]; see also
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2054 (1995) ("[O1ur cases recognize that local
autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition ... and that a district court
must strive to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system
operating in compliance with the Constitution.") [hereinafter Jenkins II]. The case
history for Missouri v. Jenkins is both extensive and confusing. Several issues related
to the initial facts were litigated separately using the same case name. For the pur-
poses of this article, and this article only, Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), will
be referred to as Jenkins I and Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995), will be
referred to as Jenkins II.
8. See Friedman, supra note 5 at 747-48; see also Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial
Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 716 (1978) ("The Supreme Court has not
yet reviewed any of the orders that significantly increase government expenditures for
prisons or mental institutions."); Robert F. Nagel, Controlling the Structural Injunc-
tion, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395, 396-97 (1984) ("At present the Supreme Court
is either unwilling or unable to provide any effective restraint on the intrusions of the
federal judiciary into state and local government.").
9. The lower court opinions in both Jenkins II, 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995), and Spal-
lone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990), had a strong impact on the specific commu-
nities and on the nation in general.
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remedial orders.'0 Some scholars have criticized this active partici-
pation as judicial intermingling in legislative and executive affairs,"
while others have argued that the district courts are overstepping
constitutional boundaries.'" Yet, because of the serious constitu-
tional rights that are at stake, courts continue to zealously partici-
pate in the remedial process.
Over the last several years, the Supreme Court has addressed the
relationship between the district court and the local government in
the creation, enforcement, and termination stages of remedial or-
ders in desegregation cases. In Missouri v. Jenkins J,13 the Court
held that a remedial order requiring the locality to raise its prop-
erty tax was not an unconstitutional limitation on local taxing au-
thority. 14 Yet, in Missouri v. Jenkins I1,1 the Court held that the
district court exceeded its remedial power when it ordered salary
increases to improve the "desegregative attractiveness" of the Kan-
sas City schools.16 Furthermore, the Court, in Spallone v. United
States,'7 held that the district court violated traditional equitable
principles when it punished local legislators with contempt sanc-
tions for failing to enforce the court's remedial order.' 8
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,'9 Freeman v.
Pitts,2 0 and Missouri v. Jenkins 11,21 the Court outlined the steps
that a district court must follow before it can relinquish its supervi-
sion of its remedial measures in school desegregation cases. In
Dowell, the Court emphasized the importance of local control over
education, and held that a district court may terminate a remedial
order upon a finding that the school board acted in good faith and
that the vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the
greatest extent practicable.2 In Freeman, the Court observed that
10. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990); Milliken 11, 433 U.S. 267
(1977); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Missouri v.
Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
11. Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 711 (1978).
12. Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH & LEE L. REV.
949 (1978).
13. 495 U.S. 33 (1990) [hereinafter Jenkins I]. See supra, note 7.
14. Id. at 57.
15. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
16. Id. at 2054.
17. 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
18. Id. at 274.
19. U.S. 237 (1991).
20. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
21. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
22. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 237.
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"local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition" 3
and held that a district court may relinquish supervision in incre-
mental stages. Finally, in Jenkins II, the Court stated that termina-
tion only requires a finding that the victims of discrimination
occupy the position they would have, had the discrimination never
occurred.4
In all of these cases, the Court suggests that considerations of
federalism guide the discretion of the district court, and that the
court should respect the autonomy and integrity of the local gov-
ernment in remedying the violation.2 5 Yet, by permitting the dis-
trict court to use broad, autocratic strokes to fashion a remedial
order while curtailing the court's power to enforce the order, the
Supreme Court, under the guise of supporting local autonomy, is
placing the city in an even more precarious position.
This Article examines the conflict between preserving local au-
tonomy and remedying constitutional violations in the context of
school desegregation. Part I articulates the problem by exploring
the role of the city and its part in institutional reform. The first
section explains what is meant by local autonomy. The second sec-
tion examines what constitutes institutional reform. The third sec-
tion discusses an example of the clash between local autonomy and
institutional reform in the context of the ongoing struggle in Kan-
sas City, Missouri. Part II examines how the Supreme Court has
viewed the relationship between the remedial powers of district
courts and municipal autonomy of local governments.
Finally, Part III argues for a more coherent system of balancing
judicial involvement and local government autonomy in fashioning
remedial orders. The Article concludes that consideration of local
autonomy only belongs in the formulation stage of the remedial
process. A local government's cooperation and participation in the
formulation phase will lead to a remedial plan that can be more
successfully implemented than one that is court-imposed.
Local autonomy, however, should not be a consideration in
either the enforcement or the dissolution stage of the remedial or-
der. District courts must be given broad discretion to enforce the
order and to determine whether the violation has been remedied.
The Court's recent decisions, which emphasize the importance of
returning school districts to local control, prevents the violations
23. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
406, 410 (1977)).
24. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2041.
25. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2054; Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489; Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248.
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from being adequately remedied. A method which stresses consid-
erations of local autonomy in the remedy formulation stage and
allows district court discretion in the enforcement and termination
stages will minimize the intrusions into the affairs of local govern-
ment and ensure a successful remedy.
I. The Relationship Between Local Autonomy and Institutional
Reform: The Problem
Over the last forty years,26 institutional reform litigation has be-
come commonplace.27 In these lawsuits, plaintiffs, usually using
the class action device, seek to reform government-operated insti-
tutions through equitable judicial decrees.2 s Because many of
these institutions are operated by the city, the city is frequently a
defendant in these lawsuits.
The modern city plays many roles in institutional reform litiga-
tion mainly because it is home to over seventy percent of the
26. The counting begins with the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
27. For example, there are over 500 local school districts currently operating under
court orders to desegregate, and prisons in over 40 states are under judicial supervi-
sion because of constitutional violations. David 0. Stewart, No Exit: Supreme Court
Finds No Easy Path to Terminate Structural Injunctions, 78-Jun A.B.A. J. 49 (1992).
28. There are many scholarly pieces on institutional reform litigation. See OWEN
M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REME-
DIES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (1990); Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent
Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725 (1986); Lloyd C.
Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class
Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 679 (1983); Robert E. Buckholz, Jr. et al.,
Special Project: The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 784 (1978); Michael Finch, Fairness and Finality in Institutional Litigation:
The Lessons of School Desegregation, 4 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 109 (1994); William
A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legit-
imacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982); Barry Friedman, supra note 5; Donald L. Horowitz,
Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983
DUKE L.J. 1265 (1983); Karen Keeble, Judicial Modification of Consent Judgments in
Institutional Reform Litigation, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 657 (1984); David I. Levine, The
Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in Federal Institutional
Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 753 (1984);
David I. Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional Reform Litiga-
tion: A Commentary of the Supreme Court's Adoption of the Second Circuit's Flexible
Test, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1239 (1993); Maimon Schwartzschild, Public Law By Private
Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Re-
form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 897 (1984); Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Correc-
tions Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1993); Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of
Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1993); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in
Mass Tort Litigation, 888 Nw. U. L. REV. 469 (1984).
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American population.29 The people who call the city home repre-
sent a wide variety of political, economic, and social views within
one local unit.30 Primarily due to its accessibility, the city govern-
ment is the most responsive source of protection and opportunity
for its constituents.
In addition to being home to a wide variety of individuals with
disparate needs and values, the city is a governing body with pow-
ers and responsibilities. Cities differ considerably in their size,
wealth, and functions.31 The policies and programs of actual local
governments are as varied as the cities themselves.
In 1984, a federal district court ruled that both the Kansas City
School Board (KCMSD) and the State of Missouri had intention-
ally segregated the public schools within Kansas City.32 Although
ten years have passed since the district court ordered a desegrega-
tion plan, evidence of racial and ethnic segregation is still preva-
lent.33 Kansas City has made national headlines with its continuing
battle to provide a desegregated education to children who reside
in the inner-city. 34 The State has contributed more than $800 mil-
lion to the program since 1986.35 Kansas City is the perfect exam-
ple of a municipality torn between the need to retain local
autonomy and the need to remedy years of intentional segregation.
A. Local Autonomy: A Triple-Edged Sword
Local autonomy involves three relationships: federal/state, fed-
eral/local, and state/local. In institutional reform, the litigation
dwells where the federal/state, federal/local, and state/local rela-
tionships intersect.36 Because the city is only a political subdivision
29. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL DATA BOOK
AND GUIDE TO SOURCES, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (114th ed.
1994). In 1992, 79.7% of the United States population inhabited metropolitan areas.
Id. at table 39. This is an increase of over 11% from 1970. Id. For a definition of
metropolitan areas, see id. at App. 2.
30. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Govern-
ment Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1990); D. Bruce La Pierre, Enforcement of Judg-
ments Against States and Local Governments: Judicial Control Over the Power to Tax,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 299 (1993).
31. Briffault, supra note 30, at 2.
32. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987).
33. See William H. Freivogel, School Desegregation Comes to a Crossroads, ST.
Louis POST, June 18, 1995, at lB.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See generally Briffault, supra note 30 (discussing the powers of local govern-
ment and the social and political ramifications of those powers); Richard Briffault,
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of the state, the. federal/state relationship establishes the parame-
ters for the interaction between the federal government and the
city. Additionally, because the local government receives its power
from the state, it must frequently rely on the state to finance the
remedy.
Local autonomy is initially defined by the relationship between
the state and its cities. Historically, most governance functions
were exercised by the state, not by the local government. Cities
were more concerned with managing their properties than: with ex-
ercising taxing or regulatory power.37 Local political subdivisions
were corporations that owed their existence to a charter granted by
the state. Thus, unlike states, local governments were beholden
and accountable to a higher governmental power.38 This view was
embodied in Dillon's Rule, which stated that municipalities only
possessed those powers that were expressly delegated to them by
the state.39
Dillon's Rule no longer represents the relationship between a
state and its cities.4° Most states have conferred some type of
Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990)
(discussing the relationship of local government power to federal power) [hereinafter
Part II]. See also Frug, supra note 8, at 718-32 (discussing the expansion of federal
courts' powers and how that affects the local government).
37. See HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE COR-
PORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 192-204 (1983).
38. See Briffault, supra note 30; Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1128-48 (1980) (describing and attacking the public/private
distinction).
39. JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
89 145 (Boston, Little, Brown) (4th ed. 1880). In his treatise, Dillon stated that "the
power of the legislature over municipal corporations is supreme and transcendent: it
may ... erect, change, divide, and even abolish them, at pleasure, as it deems the
public good to require." Id. at 93.
40. As a result of political struggles between cities and states during the nine-
teenth century, however, home rule developed, whereby a state could transfer some
of its governmental powers to the local government. See Judith A. Stoll, Home Rule
and the Sherman Act After Boulder: Cities Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 49
BROOK. L. REV. 259 (1983). The object of this transfer of authority is "a more equita-
ble and efficient allocation of duties and rights between the state and its cities." Sid-
ney H. Asch, Municipal Home Rule in New York, 20 BROOK. L. REV. 201, 202 (1954).
As the cities grew and the need for services grew, however, state legislatures began to
assert a greater influence on the governing of the city. See Terrence Sandalow, The
Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role For the Courts, 48 MINN. L.
REV. 643, 647 (1964). Although the cities have developed the political power to ac-
quire some sort of local autonomy, the struggle involving the allocation of duties and
rights between the states and their cities continues to rage. See James D. Cole, Consti-
tutional Home Rule in New York: "The Ghost of Home Rule," 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
713 (1985). This struggle becomes especially important when local governments are
ready, willing, and, but for state law curtailing their powers, able to remedy the consti-
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"home rule" authority on its cities.4' Under home rule authority,
the city is granted the power to initiate legislation in matters of
local concern without first seeking authority from the state legisla-
ture.42 The ability of the local governments to promulgate policy
without having to account to the state is similar to the autonomy
that the states enjoy from the federal government. Although the
state legislature has the power to preempt local legislative deci-
sions, preemption is not lightly granted. Thus, most states em-
power the local government with decisional authority with respect
to local matters.
The city, however, does not enjoy complete autonomy. Even
under home rule authority, a local government may not enact "pri-
vate law."'43 The areas of property law, contract law, and tort law
are not considered matters of local concern. 4 Secondly, unlike the
federal/state system which allows state fiscal autonomy,45 home
rule provisions leave the state in control of local financing. 6
Under some home rule provisions, local governments must seek
state legislative approval before imposing a tax on their citizens.47
Jurisdictions that allow local governments to initiate fiscal policies
are very liberal in permitting state preemption of local taxing deci-
tutional violation. See Association of Surrogates v. New York, 772 F. Supp. 1412
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). There is also statutory home rule, where the constitution authorizes
state legislatures to pass laws on home rule and the power is therefore conferred
through state statutes to the local governments.
41. The state, either by statute or through a constitutional provision, confers pow-
ers upon a local government. See Briffault, supra note 30 at 9-18 (advocating the
effectiveness of home rule provisions). When substantial authority is granted to a
locality in a state constitution, that constitutional provision is called a "home rule"
provision. Id.
42. The two basic components of home rule are an affirmative grant of power to
the municipalities to manage their own affairs and a restriction on the state legislature
from intruding upon matters of local concern. Local autonomy is defined by these
two aspects of home rule. Determining the relationship between the powers of the
city under home rule and the ability of the state to legislate has been a recurring role
for the courts. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Williams, 128 Wash. 2d 341 (Wash. 1995); Sip
& Save Liquors, Inc. v. Daley, 657 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
43. Sandalow, supra note 40, at 674-79.
44. Id at 678-79.
45. See generally George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-
How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Impli-
cations of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L.J. 363 (1985); Lawrence
Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977).
46. See Frug, supra note 38, at 1064.
47. FRANK I. MICHELMAN & TERRANCE SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERN-
MENT IN URBAN AREAS, 422-47 (1970); OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT LAW 40, at 110-112 (1982); Frug, supra note 38, at 1064.
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sions.1 Because desegregation remedies are often so expensive,
and must rely on state approved financing, the fiscal limitation on
local governments becomes very important. 9
In many areas, local governments have displaced the state as the
primary governing and service-providing unit. ° Cities legislate on
matters affecting their citizens' economic and social activities, have
their own police forces, and enforce their laws in their own
courts.-" Cities own and manage hospitals, provide low-income
housing, and provide educational services. z
In some areas, the city enjoys complete autonomy from the state,
while in others it does not.53 Cities are partially created by state
law, but are also created by the people who live within them, mak-
ing the nature of the city difficult to categorize.54 Thus, the rela-
tionship between the state and its cities is complicated. Local
autonomy is further complicated by the relationship between the
federal government and the city.
Cities are not mentioned at all in the United States Constitution.
There are few cases where the Supreme Court addresses local au-
tonomy.55 In these cases, the Court has used federalism principals
to protect local governments from federal intrusion. For example,
in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,56 the Court upheld a
local property tax scheme for financing public schools under Equal
Protection scrutiny.57 Similarly, in National League of Cities v.
48. See Frug, supra note 38, at 1062; see also Sandalow, supra note 40, at 647.
49. See Jenkins II, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2044 (1995) ("The District Court's Desegrega-
tion plan has been described as the most ambitious and expensive remedial program
in the history of school desegregation. The annual cost per pupil at the KSMSD far
exceeds that of the neighboring SSB'd or of any school district in Missouri.").
50. See Briffault, Part II, supra note 36, at 354, 382; see also JON C. TEAFORD, THE
MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 16, 35 (1975); Frug, supra note 38, at 1096.
51. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Should Political Subdivisions Be Accorded Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 577, 603 (1994) (discussing how it is
difficult to distinguish the function performed by the state from the functions per-
formed by local entities). City governments had to request authorization from the
state government to perform and finance these operations. Teaford, supra note 50, at
108. Many municipalities received this authorization under new charters. Others,
such as New York City, retained their colonial charters and had to get specific author-
ization from their state legislatures. Id.
52. Most state constitutions require the state to perform educational functions, but
most states have delegated this function to the city or school boards. E.g., N.Y.
CONST. art XI.
53. See generally Sandalow, supra note 40.
54. See Frug, supra note 38, at 1062-63.
55. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
56. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
57. 411 U.S. at 6.
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Usery, 8 the Court suggested that because local governments derive
their power from the states, their decisions regarding local matters
are protected from federal interference by the Tenth Amend-
ment. 9 Municipalities are, treated as states for purposes of "state
action" under the Fourteenth Amendment60 and double jeop-
ardy.6' Yet, the Court views local governments as independent
from states under the Eleventh Amendment because they function
as independent corporate bodies even though they are "territori-
ally a part of the state. '62
The Court does not specifically recognize local autonomy as hav-
ing a "distinct constitutional value. '63 In order to take advantage
of notions of federalism, proponents of local autonomy have en-
deavored to identify cities with states.64 Proponents argue that be-
58. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
59. Id. at 844 n.20 (1976); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 866-67 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Takings Clause should
not be interpreted so as to disable local governments from performing their regula-
tory functions); First English Lutheran Evangelical Church v. Los Angeles Co., 482
U.S. 304, 340-41 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court's Takings
Clause will inhibit local regulatory actions beneficial to the public welfare). But see
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 60-71 (1982) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (arguing that local governments should have the same immunity
from federal antitrust liability that states enjoy).
60. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968).
61. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 393 (1970).
62. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133. U.S. 529, 530 (1890). The 11th Amendment
divests the federal courts of a piece of Article III power by depriving them of the
ability to hear "any suit in law or equity" initiated against "one of the United States
by Citizens of another state or subjects of any foreign state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The Amendment was ratified in 1789, and overturned Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419 (1793), which held that a citizen of South Carolina was entitled to recover
an outstanding debt that arose from the sale of Revolutionary War Supplies from the
State of Georgia. The provision affords immunity to the states and the Supreme
Court has extended immunity to state offspring that it defines as arms of the state.
This does not include local governments, which are considered to be political subdivi-
sions. See Alex E. Rogers, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Im-
munity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-Of-The-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1243 (1992) (discussing the difficulty in differentiating between arms of the
state and municipal corporation).
63. In Briffault, supra note 30, at 86-115, Professor Briffault argues that cases such
as Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), Millikin v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974) [hereinafter Millikin I], San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), and Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985),
establish the Court's willingness to find Constitutional support for the autonomy of
local government units. But see Durchslag, supra note 51, at 609 (arguing that all of
these cases focus on protecting the autonomy of the state and not the local
government).
64. See Gerald E. Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System, 19 URB. LAW. 553,
553 (1987).
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cause cities are mere political subdivisions of the states, principles
of federalism protect cities from federal control.65 This argument is
contradictory because cities must be separate from the state for lo-
cal autonomy to exist. The dichotomy becomes pronounced in the
area of federal court remedial orders because they necessarily in-
volve competing state, city, and national interests.66
B. Institutional Reform: Across the Ravine
The remedial process in institutional reform litigation involves
four different phases. First, the court must determine that a consti-
tutional right has been violated.67 Section 1983 creates a cause of
action for any person injured by the deprivation of a constitutional
right (including the right to a desegregated education) at the hands
of the state.68 Although section 1983 authorizes both legal and eq-
uitable relief, it does not define a specific remedy. 69 Once the insti-
tution has been found to be liable, the court must fashion an
appropriate remedy.70 After the remedy has been created, the
court must ensure that it is enforced.71 Finally, the court must de-
termine when to terminate the remedy.72
65. Id. at 554.
66. Id. at 556.
67. This aspect of the remedial process is beyond the scope of this article.
68. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or any persons within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in any action of law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceedings for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Federaljurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) & (4) (1994). A lawsuit can also be
brought under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et. seq.
(1994) A third basis for bringing a lawsuit'is 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1994).
69. Congress has considered legislation that would define desegregation remedies.
See, e.g., H.R. 14553, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ("establish[ing] standards for the
framing of relief in suits to desegregate the Nation's elementary and secondary public
schools .... ").
70. Section 1983 creates a cause of action for any person injured by the depriva-
tion of constitutional rights, including the right to a desegregated education.
Although section 1983 authorizes both legal and equitable relief, it does not define
the remedy. In addition, section 1983 does not address questions of enforcement or
execution of judgments against state or local governments or officers. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994).
71. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 735-36 ("Without an available and enforceable
remedy, a right may be nothing more than a nice idea.").
72. See Friedman, supra note 5, at 743 (arguing that the remedial process has three
phases - definition of the right, determination of the remedy, and enforcement). For
further information on the remedial phase of institutional reform litigation, see Curtis
J. Berger, Away from the Courthouse and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special
Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978); Abram Chayes, Foreward: Public Law Litiga-
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Because most civil rights lawsuits seek structural injunctive re-
lief, the court is faced with the task of eliminating the constitu-
tional violation by restructuring an offending organization.73 The
process of formulating a remedy to accomplish this task poses
problems distinct from the initial finding of a constitutional viola-
tion. The nature of relief in institutional reform litigation places
the courts in an unfamiliar role; they must implement reforms with-
out having expertise about the institution in question. 74 The for-
mulation of a remedy often involves broad policy decisions as the
courts attempt to ensure that the violation is eliminated.75
Generally, the remedy comes in the form of a consent decree or
a judicial decree. A consent decree is a hybrid of a contract and an
injunction.76 The parties fashion a remedy and then request that
tion and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982); Abram Chayes, The Role of a
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Fletcher, supra note
28; Mishkin, supra note 12; Nagel, supra note 8; Nagel, supra note 11; Donald H.
Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in
the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987).
An additional phase may involve the need to restore the court's supervision once it
has been released due to circumstances that change the unitary status. See David I.
Levine, The Latter Stages of Enforcement of Equitable Decrees: The Course of Institu-
tional Reform After Dowell, Rufo, and Freeman, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579, 629
(1993) (discussing the restoration of court supervision after jurisdiction has ended).
73. "The structural suit is one in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy
over values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the organization to
eliminate a threat to those values posed by the present institutional arrangements.
The injunction is the means by which these reconstructive directives are transmitted".
Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979).
74. Ordinarily the court avoids this kind of judicial second-guessing. See, e.g.,
Lloyd C. Anderson, Release and Resumption of Jurisdiction Over Consent Decrees in
Structural Reform Litigation, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 401, 403 (1987) (indicating that the
judge's decision to end supervision in a case involves many factors creating conflicts
between idealism and moral dictates).
75. The remedial phase "is concerned not with the enforcement of a remedy al-
ready given, but with the giving or shaping of the remedy itself .... The task is to
remove the condition that threatens the constitutional values." Fiss, supra note 73 at
27-28. But Professor Fiss also argues that an effective enforcement of constitutional
rights comes from complex, ongoing involvement of the trial court in shaping the
relief. Id.
76. A consent decree is a court order that approves and embodies a negotiated
agreement between the parties. Once the court approves an agreement, it either signs
the settlement agreement or enters a separate order that requires the parties to com-
ply with the settlement agreement. Because a consent decree grants injunctive relief
and has the same binding effect as an adjudicated decree, the court, by approving the
consent decree, commits the full power of the judiciary to enforce its obligations
under the decree. A consent decree is the equivalent of a judgment. Since a struc-
tural injunction involves changes over time in the operation of an institution, they can
be considered judicial acts in the nature of injunctions. See generally Levine, supra
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the court enter judgment based on their agreement.77 The court
monitors the agreement to ensure that the parties comply with its
terms. The consent decree is enforced through the court's power
to enforce any equitable decree or order.78 A judicial decree con-
sists of a structural injunction, which is a judicial command that
prohibits or proscribes some discrete act of the defendant.79 If the
parties have difficulty negotiating a consent decree, the court will
impose a structural injunction through a judicial decree.8°
Whether an injunction is issued or the parties reach an agree-
ment, court involvement does not end with the entering of a judg-
ment. A remedy for institutional change is complex and is often
accompanied by disputes over the interpretation of the order,
resistance by the institution, and crises over funding. 81 When a de-
fendant has violated the requirements of a decree, a court may im-
pose an injunction, ordering the defendant to comply or directing
the defendant to take specific steps to redress its violation.82
There are some limitations on injunctive relief. One limitation is
comity, the idea that a federal court should not impermissibly in-
trude on the discretion of state executive officials.83 Yet, courts
note 72; Schwarzschild, supra note 28; Symposium, Consent Decrees: Practical
Problems and Legal Dilemmas, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1.
77. "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such a manner as the court directs." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
78. See Anderson, supra note 28, at 746 ("[C]ourts have inherent equitable power
to enter supplemental orders to enforce, implement, and effectuate their judgements
and decrees.").
79. Id. at 726 ("A consent decree is a hybrid in the law containing elements of
both contract and injunction.").
80. Id.
81. Id. at 727.
82. Id. at 737-752 (describing the court's role in implementing the decree).
83. The idea of comity first appeared in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
The Court held that the federal court could not enjoin state criminal prosecutions
unless the defendant is threatened with irreparable injury to his constitutional rights.
The Court recognized that the reason to restrain the federal court is reinforced by:
the notion of 'comity,' that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recogni-
tion of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate
state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Gov-
ernment will fare best if the states and their institutions are left free to per-
form their separate functions in their separate ways.
Id. at 44.
The Defendant may also raise the Eleventh Amendment as a limitation on the
injunctive power of the federal courts. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265
(1990) (deciding that the immunity doctrine must come into play in the District
Court's exercise of discretion). Under the l1th Amendment, a federal court is pro-
hibited from awarding retrospective monetary relief that is payable out of the state
treasury. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-69 (1974). A structural consent de-
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have ordered the implementation of injunctions when a defendant
has demonstrated substantial noncompliance, disregarded the con-
sent decree, or continued to violate the plaintiff's constitutional
rights.84  In addition, the court may also order contempt sanc-
tions.8 5 A finding of contempt explicitly recognizes that the spirit
of consent and cooperation has died. The court must hold a hear-
ing on a motion for contempt which has the semblance of a full
trial.86 Once the court has held a defendant in contempt, it has the
authority to impose sanctions, such as monetary fines, to ensure
future compliance.8 7
Finally, a defendant will seek release from the district court's ju-
risdiction usually by showing that it has substantially complied with
the provisions of the decree.8 When a defendant is a school board
in a desegregation case, the district court must release the board
from its jurisdiction within a reasonable time if the system has
achieved unitary status.89  The Supreme Court has recently held
cree, however, is a form of injunctive relief that is prospective in nature, requiring the
defendants to implement policy changes in the future. Id. The 11th Amendment does
not bar prospective injunctive relief that has the practical effect of requiring the state
to spend money. Id.
84. Anderson, supra note 28, at 739.
85. If the court must decide a contempt motion, it must first determine whether to
impose civil or criminal contempt. Civil contempt is remedial in nature, and either
ensures compliance with the decree or compensates the plaintiff for the defendant's
failure to comply with the order. Criminal contempt is punitive, and exists to vindi-
cate the court's authority. Fines or imprisonment characterize criminal contempt. See
Spallone, 493 U.S. at 265.
86. Before a court can find civil contempt, a defendant must violate the consent
decree. While no intent to violate the decree is necessary, the plaintiffs carry a heavy
burden of proving substantial noncompliance with clear and convincing evidence. See
Anderson, supra note 28, at 737-752. Although a good faith attempt to comply with a
decree is not a defense, the defendants can demonstrate impossibility of compliance
as a defense. Id. It is not enough to show that they tried and failed; they must show
that they have exhausted every possibility. Id.
87. See Spallone, 493 U.S. at 265.
88. See Levine, supra note 72, at 579. Courts must often modify the consent de-
cree as a result of changes during the life of the litigation. Id. A motion to modify is
based on the premise that the order has to be changed because it is not equitable to
require compliance with one of its directives. Id. This is contrasted with a request to
be released from the active supervision of the district court, which is based on the
premise that the order needs to be modified because the defendant has complied with
some of its provisions. Id.
89. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
For a further discussion, see infra notes 202-12 and accompanying text. The Supreme
Court is continuing to grapple with the issue of what constitutes a "unitary" status.
See infra notes 202-03, 234-36 and accompanying text. See Anderson, supra note 74;
Kevin Brown, Termination of Public School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary
Status Based on the Elimination of Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L.
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that a school district can be released from an order in incremental
stages before all of the vestiges of segregation are gone. 90 The
Court stated that the goal of the district court is not only to remedy
the violation, but to restore state and local control as quickly as
possible.91
C. The Clash: Kansas City, Missouri
In 1977, the Kansas City Missouri School District (KCMSD) and
students from the district filed a complaint against the State of Mis-
souri and the school districts surrounding Kansas City, alleging that
the defendants operated a dual school system.92 In 1978, the
school board was realigned as a defendant, but the plaintiff and the
school board maintained a relationship of "friendly adversaries. 93
After a long trial, the district court held that KCMSD and the State
of Missouri operated an intradistrict segregated school system.94
The State of Missouri had mandated segregated schools for black
and white children sometime before 1954.9- Each school district
participated in this dual school system before it was declared un-
constitutional in Brown L96 In holding the state liable for inten-
tionally segregating the schools, the district court pointed out that
the state established and maintained a separate university for black
students, allowed school boards to establish separate libraries, pub-
lic parks and playgrounds for blacks and whites, and allowed its
courts to enforce racially restrictive covenants.97 This "created an
atmosphere in which private white individuals could justify their
REv. 1105 (1990); Dennis G. Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 41 (1987).
90. See infra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
91. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
92. School Dist. of Kansas City v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 427 (W.D. Mo.
1978), appeal dismissed, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979) (realigning KCMSD as a party
defendant and dismissing other defendants for lack of jurisdiction).
93. School District of Kansas City, 460 F. Supp. at '442.
94. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1505 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The court did
not find evidence of interdistrict segregation and dismissed the claims against the sur-
rounding school districts. Id. at 1488.
95. See Mo. CONST. art. X, § 1(a) (1945) (rescinded 1976) and §§ 163.130, 165.117
R.S. Mo. (repealed 1957). These provisions were not formally abrogated after the
Brown decision was announced. However, the United States Attorney General is-
sued an opinion in 1954 declaring them unenforceable. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1490.
The statutes were repealed in 1957 and the constitutional provision was rescinded in
1976. Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
826 (1980). See also United States v. Missouri, 363 F. Supp. 739, 746-47 (E.D. Mo.
1973), aff'd, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975).
96. 347 U.S. at 483.
97. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1503.
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bias and prejudice against blacks. '9 8 Thus, the State of Missouri
and the school board were found liable for failing to eliminate the
vestiges of a racially segregated school system.99
The district court issued a remedial order and estimated the fi-
nancing necessary to implement the order. 1°° The court appor-
tioned seventy-five per cent of the costs to the state and twenty-
five per cent to KCMSD. 1 1 Because a provision in the Missouri
Constitution limited property taxes, the district court was con-
cerned that KCMSD would be unable to pay its share. °2 Conse-
quently, the court enjoined a property tax rollback, thereby
allowing the school district to raise additional funds. 10 3 Further-
more, the court ordered the school district to submit to the voters a
proposal to increase taxes so that it may pay for its share of the
desegregation costs. 04 The school district's efforts to persuade the
voters to approve the tax increase failed, as did efforts to receive
funding from the Kansas City Council or the legislature.0 5 After
approving additional remedial measures, °6 the court concluded
that the school district had exhausted all means of raising revenue,
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1505.
100. Id. at 1506.
101. The Eighth Circuit later ruled that the district court had not given adequate
justification for apportioning the costs and ordered the court to divide the costs
equally. Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 685 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1034 (1989). On remand, the district court held that the doctrine of compar-
ative negligence supported its original ruling and held the tortfeasors jointly and
severably liable to ensure funding for the remedy. Jenkins I, 495 U.S. 33, 41 (1990).
102. The constitutional provision limited property taxes to $1.25 per $100 of as-
sessed valuation unless a majority of voters approved an increase of up to $3.75 per
$100. Any further increase required the approval of two thirds of the voting constitu-
ency. Mo. CONST. art. X, §§ 11(b), (c). Another obstacle to raising money was the
"Hancock Amendment," which required property tax rates to be decreased to match
any increase in revenue resulting from a decreased property value reassessment, and
thus precluded increasing tax revenues by increasing property taxes. Mo. CONST. art.
X, § 22(a); Mo. REv. STAT. § 137.073 (Supp. 1990). Finally, Proposition C established
a common trust fund for state education, but had the effect of channeling almost half
of the sales tax collected in Kansas City to other parts of Missouri. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 164.013.1 (Supp. 1990).
103. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The court estimated
that the total cost of desegregation would be $88,000,000 over a period of three years.
Id. at 44.
104. Id.
105. Jenkins 1, 495 U.S. at 40.
106. One of the criticisms of the court's involvement in the scope of the remedial
order is that it continued to approve remedial measures in the same proceedings
where it was trying to determine how to finance KCMSD's share. Jenkins v. Missouri,
672 F. Supp. 400, 408 (W.D. Mo. 1987). The new improvements eventually totaled an
additional $187,450,334. Id.
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and ordered a raise in the school district property tax levy which
clearly exceeded the state limits.107 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit affirmed the order, rejecting the state's comity
argument that a federal court lacks the judicial power to order a
tax increase. 0 8 The Eighth Circuit held that any state law limita-
tions must fall to the supremacy of the United States
Constitution. 109
The United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. Jenkins 1,110
held that the district court had abused its discretion by directly im-
posing the tax."' The Court found that the district court had vio-
lated the principle of comity and that it should have used a less
intrusive method. 12
Recently, in Missouri v. Jenkins II,"3 the State of Missouri ar-
gued that the federal judiciary had gone too far in overseeing the
Kansas City School District's desegregation program and that it re-
sulted in "the most expensive remedial program in the history of
school desegregation.""' 4 When the district court ordered the Kan-
sas City schools desegregated in 1985, it found that "segregation
had caused a system-wide reduction in student achievement."" 5
The state argued eight years later that it had fully implemented the
programs required under the remedial order, and asked for an or-
der of partial unitariness." 6 The district court held that the state
had to show some evidence of improved student achievement
before that determination could be made. 1 7 In addition, the dis-
trict court ordered the state to pay for wage increases of district
personnel in order to attract highly skilled workers." 8 In arguing
for a reversal, the state of Missouri contended that these actions far
outweighed the scope of the initial violation. 19
The Eighth Circuit rejected the State's request for partial unitary
status and held that the salary increases were directly related to
107. Id. at 412.
108. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1313 (8th Cir. 1988).
109.' Id.
110. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
111. Id. at 37.
112. Id.
113. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
114. Id at 2044.
115. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
116. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2045.
117. Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 766 (8th Cir. 1993).
118. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2045.
119. Id. at 2047.
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remedying the constitutional violation.12 0 Reversing the Eighth
Circuit, the Supreme Court held that the district court exceeded its
remedial authority in ordering the funding of salary increases for
district personnel.'12 The Court further held that the district court
erred in using student achievement levels to determine unitari-
ness. 12 2 Instead, the Court determined that the test for unitariness
should be based on the following three factors: (i) whether there
has been full compliance with the decree in the area where supervi-
sion is to be withdrawn; (ii) whether retention of judicial control is
necessary to achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of
the school system; and (iii) whether the school system has demon-
strated its good-faith commitment to the decree. 2 3
The Missouri litigation showcased the turmoil surrounding the
effort to remedy the racial discrimination that has existed in Kan-
sas City for over 40 years. It involves the nation's largest and most
expensive desegregation effort, with nearly $1.5 billion spent to re-
move racial isolation in poor quality schools.124 It is also an exam-
ple of the district courts' need for direction about federal, local and
state entities and their responsibilities in the remedial process.
HI. The Supreme Court's Role in Defining the Parameters of
Local Autonomy in School Desegregation Cases: A
Study in Contrast
Over the last forty years, the Supreme Court has examined the
tension between local autonomy and institutional reform in several
school desegregation cases. The cases can be divided into four dif-
ferent categories of conflicts: between local autonomy and the
court's initial involvement in the lawsuit; between local autonomy
and the scope of the remedy; between local autonomy and enforce-
ment; and between local autonomy and termination. In each of
these different categories, the Court has sent conflicting messages
to the district courts about the importance of local autonomy in
institutional reform.
120. Jenkins, 11 F.3d at 765, 768.
121. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2051.
122. Id. at 2065.
123. Id. at 2041.
124. Id. at 2044.
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A. Initial Involvement and Scope of Remedy
The origin of institutional reform can be traced to Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown 11).125 In that secondary litigation, the
Supreme Court directed the district court to implement the right to
non-segregated education established in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion (Brown J).12 6 Although the Court did not specifically address
the issue of local autonomy in Brown II, it acknowledged the need
for federal courts to reconcile public needs with public interest
when dealing with desegregation remedies.127 The Court did not
establish any limitation on the courts' powers to remedy discrimi-
nation, but stated that equity has traditionally been characterized
by "practical flexibility.' '1 28
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,2 9 the
Court truncated the district court's involvement by stressing that
judicial authority may only be invoked after school authorities
have failed in their affirmative obligations to eliminate segrega-
tion.' 30 The Court emphasized that although "breadth and flexibil-
ity" are necessary in equitable remedies, the scope of the remedy
must be limited by the nature of the constitutional violation.' 31 In
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,32 the Court reaffirmed
its prior view that the remedy must be narrowly tailored to the
violation. It also explicitly recognized that "the local autonomy of
school districts is a vital national tradition.' '1 33
125. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown 11].
126. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
127. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
128. Id.
129. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
130. Id. at 15.
131. Id.
132. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
133. Id. at 410. In Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Supreme
Court approved an application of the principles it laid out in Brown I. 349 U.S. at
300. The Court in Griffin upheld the district court's injunction disallowing state tax
credits to parents who sent their children to segregated private schools while the
county kept the public schools closed. Griffin, 377 U.S. at 225. The Court approved
the remedy, but emphasized that the district court's power to affect state taxing plans
was not plenary because a federal court can only require the local governments "to
exercise the power that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to ... maintain
without racial discrimination a public school system." Id. at 233.
In North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971), the Supreme
Court upheld the enjoining of North Carolina's anti-busing law, which had prevented
the local school board from complying with the district court's remedial order. Id. at
46. The Court held that if a state-imposed limitation on a school authority's discretion
hinders desegregation, the state policy must fall. Id. at 45.
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The Court again examined the scope of remedial authority in
Milliken II.'3 In affirming the district court's desegregation plan,
the Court formulated a three-part test for the propriety of an insti-
tutional remedy. First, the desegregation remedy must be deter-
mined in relation to the nature and scope of the constitutional
violation.135 Second, the decree must be remedial in nature and
thus restore the victims to the position they would have occupied
but for the discriminatory conduct. 36 Third, the federal courts
"must take into account the interests of state and local authorities
in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution.' 1 37
In sum, district courts must balance the autonomy interests of local
governments against the nature and scope of the offensive conduct
when creating a remedy.
In Missouri v. Jenkins /,138 the Court outlined the parameters of
a remedial order that can be imposed by a district court. In that
case, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the district court
abused its discretion when it imposed a property tax increase on
the municipality. 139 The Court found that this was a drastic step
that not only intruded on local authority but circumvented it com-
pletely. 140 It determined that before taking such a drastic step,
there must be a positive determination that other alternatives are
not available.' 4' But, on the issue of whether the district court may
order the local government to exercise its own taxing authority, the
Court split 5-4, with the majority holding in favor of district court
134. 433 U.S. 267 (1977). In Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Supreme Court
determined that the district court could not impose a multi-district remedy absent a
finding that the other school districts committed acts that affected segregation, and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 752-753.
135. Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 495 U.S. 33 (1990). For a further discussion of the case, see Robert T. Abram-
son, Minimally Obtrusive Means Required in Imposing Desegregation Remedies Upon
Local School Districts - Missouri v. Jenkins, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 387 (1991); Stan-
ley J. Anderson, Judicially Imposed Taxation and Desegregation, 24 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 289 (1990); Scott Carleton Brenner, Judicial Taxation as a Means of Remedying
Public School Segregation Under Missouri v. Jenkins: Boldly Going Where No Federal
Court Has Gone Before, 12 WHIrIER L. REV. 551 (1991); Douglas J. Brocker, Taxa-
tion Without Representation: The Judicial Usurpation of the Power to Tax in Missouri
v. Jenkins, 69 N.C. L. REV. 741 (1991); Linwood Gunn, Missouri v. Jenkins, The Ex-
pansion of Federal Judicial Power, 7 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 495 (1991); Margaret D.
Stock, Federal Judicial Authority to Increase Local Taxes: Missouri v. Jenkins, 14
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 270 (1991).
139. Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 50.
140. Id. at 51.
141. Id.
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discretion. The majority went further to hold that the district court
may enjoin any inhibitory state laws.'4 2 Avoiding the "difficult
constitutional questions" of whether the district court's order vio-
lated Article III or the Tenth Amendment,143 the majority con-
cluded that the court ordered tax increase "contravened the
principles of comity that must govern the District Court's equitable
discretion.'"14 4 Allowing the district court to enjoin inhibitory state
laws did not circumvent local authority because it placed responsi-
bility of school desegregation on the culpable local governments. 145
Writing for the majority, Justice White maintained that the differ-
ence between the two approaches is far more than a matter of
form:
Authorizing and directing local government institutions to de-
vise and implement remedies not only protects the functions of
those institutions but, to the extent possible, also places the re-
sponsibility for solutions to the problems of segregation upon
those who have themselves created the problems. 46
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and
Scalia, filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment.147 Justice Kennedy vehemently argued that the fed-
eral judiciary does not possess the power to tax.148 He added that
such an intrusion by the federal court into state and local financing
would be a "perversion of the normal legislative process.' 49 Jus-
tice Kennedy maintained that although the district court's remedial
powers are broad, the district court may not impede the locality's
ability to function.1 50 Instead, the district court must minimize the
intrusiveness of its remedial measures as a matter of judicial discre-
tion.15 ' Justice Kennedy concluded that even if a federal court has
the power to tax in "an extreme case," this situation did not fit such
a mold.'5 2
142. Id. at 57.
143. Id. at 50.
144. Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 50.
145. Id. at 57.
146. Id. at 51.
147. Id. at 58.
148. Id.
149. Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 75. Justice Kennedy asserted that the taxing power is a
legislative, not judicial function and that judicial taxation circumvents the legislative
process designed to give taxpayers representation in taxing decisions. Id. at 69-70.
150. Id. at 74.
151. Id. at 67.
152. Id. at 75. The reaction to the decision in Jenkins I was severe. A few days
after the decision was announced, a constitutional amendment was introduced in the
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In June of 1995, the Court examined the permissible scope of a
district court's remedial authority in Jenkins 11.153 The majority
opinion written by Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, concluded that a district
court's remedial authority only extends to orders that restore "the
victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied absent that conduct ... and their eventual restoration of
state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is
operating in compliance with the Constitution.' 1 54 The Court
found that the district court's plan to attract non-minority students
to KCMSD schools was an interdistrict remedy that is beyond the
court's authority.155
The Court stated that each additional program ordered by the
district court to increase the "desegregative attractiveness" of the
school district makes KCMSD more and more dependent on addi-
tional funding from the state.156 The greater the school district's
reliance on the state treasury, the greater its reliance on supervi-
sion by the district court.157 Thus, in order to preserve the vital
national tradition of local autonomy, the Court concluded that the
district court's order of salary increases could not be sustained. 58
The opinion is a reflection of a new conservative Court, signaling
a movement towards limiting judicial involvement in the creation
of the remedy. Justice Souter argued in his dissent that the district
court must be able to enrich the city school to attract suburban
white students. 59  The majority determined, however, that it is
outside the court's purview if suburban growth and white flight re-
sults in black students remaining racially isolated in poor quality
schools. 16
0
Senate that would prevent the judiciary from ordering a state or municipality to in-
crease its taxes. S.J. Res. 295, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1990). The bill did not get out
of the subcommittee. See also Ron Combs, Schoolbooks in the Missouri River? A
Possible Response to Missouri v. Jenkins, 56 Mo. L. REV. 389 (1991).
153. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995). The Court also examined the relationship of local au-
tonomy to the termination of the remedy. See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying
text.
154. Jenkins H, 115 S. Ct. at 2041.
155. Id. at 2045.
156. Id. at 2054.
157. Id. at 2054-55.
158. Id. at 2055.
159. Jenkins H, 115 S. Ct. at 2074 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2075 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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B. Enforcement
The Court looked at the issue of enforcement in Spallone v.
United States,161 The Court found that the district court had
abused its discretion when it held city council members in con-
tempt for refusing to vote in favor of legislation implementing a
consent decree. 162 The decision followed a long series of lawsuits
that found the city of Yonkers and the Yonkers School Board liable
for intentionally enhancing racial segregation. 163 In 1987 the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that the city was lia-
ble for racial discrimination,"6 but the issue of compliance with the
district court's remedial orders had not yet been resolved.165 In its
remedial decree, the district court had directed the city to desig-
nate sites for public housing by November, 1986.166 While the ap-
161. 493 U.S. 265 (1990). For a further discussion of the case, see Lynn Samuels,
Spallone v. United States: When Constitutional Principles Collide, 7 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 527 (1991).
162. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 280.
163. See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988); United
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In a unique deci-
sion, the district court found that the city of Yonkers and the Board of Education had
jointly engaged in a pattern of housing discrimination that was intentionally designed
to segregate Yonkers public schools. Id. at 1373. Statistically, 19 out of 25 elemen-
tary schools were at least 80% white or 80% minority. Id. at 1385. The two East
Yonkers middle schools had only 62 minorities in a student population of 1312. Id.
The three Southwest Yonkers middle schools, by contrast, enrolled 79% of the dis-
trict's minority middle school students. Id. at 1385-86. The court determined that the
city's consistent pattern of locating public housing in Southwest Yonkers contributed
to school segregation. Id. at 1527. For further discussion, see Docia L. Rudley,
School Desegregation: Whose Responsibility?, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 109 (1986);
United States v. Starrett City Associates and United States v. Yonkers Board of Educa-
tion: Can More Be Done to Remedy Housing Discrimination?, 4 J. OF LEGAL COM-
MENTARY 1 (1988).
164. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987). In 1980,
the Justice Department brought an action against the city of Yonkers and the Yonkers
Community Development Agency, alleging that they had intentionally engaged in a
pattern of housing discrimination in violation of Title VIII and the equal protection
clause. The plaintiffs maintained that the city had, over a period of thirty years, dis-
proportionately restricted new subsidized housing projects to areas of the city that
were already predominantly populated by minorities. In addition, the government
alleged that the Mayor of the city of Yonkers and the city council exerted influence
over the board of education by manipulating funding, and that the board of education
itself engaged in discriminatory conduct by opening and closing schools based on ra-
cial considerations. After 89 days of trial, the district court found that due to the
combined actions of the city of Yonkers and the Yonkers School Board, public hous-
ing and public schools in the city of Yonkers had been intentionally segregated by
race. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276.
165. United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1988).
166. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
The order enjoined Yonkers from intentionally promoting racial segregation and re-
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peal was pending, the city refused to comply with the remedial
order. 167 Finally, in January of 1988, after the Second Circuit had
affirmed the judgment of racial discrimination, and the Supreme
Court had denied certiorari, the parties agreed to a consent decree
that established the framework for a long-term plan for the crea-
tion of housing.168 The decree was approved by the city council in
a five to two vote and was entered by the district court as a consent
judgment in January of 1988.169 The decree specifically stated that
the city agreed to adopt, within 90 days, legislation outlining the
construction of housing. 170
The city remained idle, and as a result, the NAACP and the
United States were forced to submit to the court a proposed Long
Term Plan Order based on a draft that had been prepared by the
city's lawyers during negotiations. 171 After a hearing on July 26,
1988, the court entered an order requiring the city of Yonkers to
enact this "legislative package," known as the Affordable Housing
Ordinance, by August 1, 1988. A failure to do so would result in
the city and the council members being held in contempt. 72 The
court order mandated escalating fines, and provided that if the leg-
islation was not enacted before August 10, 1988, any council mem-
ber who remained in contempt would be imprisoned. 173
Notwithstanding these threats, on August 1, 1988, the city coun-
cil defeated the resolution of intent to adopt the legislative package
by a vote of four to three.174 On August 2, the district court held
quired that the city take affirmative steps to disperse public housing throughout Yon-
kers. Id. The city was required to designate sites for 200 units of public housing in
east and northwest Yonkers and develop by November, 1986 a long-term plan for the
creation of additional subsidized housing in east or northwest Yonkers. Id. at 1582.
The court did not mandate the details of the plan, such as how many units should be
built, where they should be constructed, or how the city should pay for the units. City
of Yonkers, 856 F.2d at 448.
167. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d at 448. The city first defaulted and then refused to
comply. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. Under the Charter of the city of Yonkers in effect at the time, all legisla-
tive powers were vested in the city council, which consisted of an elected mayor and
six council members. Thus, the city had to act through the city council when passing
legislation. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 269.
171. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d at 449. The city council not only failed to implement
the required legislation, but voted against a resolution indicating commitment to the
implementation of the consent decree. Id.
172. Id at 450.
173. Id.
174. Id
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both the city and the council members in contempt. 175 The Second
Circuit affirmed the contempt orders. 176
The city and the council members requested a stay of sanctions
pending the filing of a petition of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.177 The Supreme Court granted a stay to the coun-
cil members but not to the city.' 78 With the city's contempt sanc-
tion approaching $1 million per day, the city council finally enacted
the Affordable Housing Ordinance on September 9, 1988, by a
vote of five to two. 179
The Supreme Court subsequently determined that it was not an
abuse of discretion for the district court to have entered contempt
sanctions against the city. 180 The city had entered into a consent
decree and thereby committed itself to enact legislation imple-
menting a plan for the creation of subsidized housing, and then
refused to do So. 1 8 ' The city was a party to the action from the
beginning, was liable for both statutory and constitutional viola-
tions, and was directly subjected to remedial orders that had been
upheld on appeal.'82
As to the sanctions imposed on the council members, the Court
emphasized that they were not parties to the action and therefore,
they had never been found individually liable.1 83 Moreover,
although the injunctive portion of the remedial order was directed
to the city and to its "officers, agents [and] employees[,]" the af-
firmative steps to disperse public housing were directed only at the
city.' 84 Although the Court declined to address whether the coun-
cil members were entitled to legislative immunity, it noted that the
district court must look at similar considerations when determining
whether and how to exercise its discretion. 85 Any restriction on a
legislator's freedom undermines the public good by interfering
with the right of people to be represented in the democratic pro-
175. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d at 451. The court found the city in contempt and
fined it $100 a day, doubling the amount for each day of non-compliance. Id. The
court found four council members in contempt and fined each of them $500 for each
day the legislation remained unadopted. Id. at 452.
176. Id. at 460.
177. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 273.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 276.
181. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d at 448-50.
182. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 276.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 274.
185. Id. at 274, 278.
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cess.18 6 Applying this principle, the Court determined that impos-
ing fines on council members would cause them to vote "not with a
view to the interests of their constituents or of the city, but with a
view solely to their own personal interests.' 1 87 The Court con-
cluded that the imposition of sanctions on the city alone would
probably have brought about the desired result. 188 Only if that ap-
proach failed to produce compliance should the district court have
considered imposing fines against the council members.
89
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, acknowledged the majority's concerns re-
garding the district court's decision to invoke contempt sanctions
against local officials.190 The dissent urged, however, that con-
tempt powers be available for use in extreme circumstances.' 9' Ar-
guing that the Court should have deferred to the district court's
familiarity and special insight into the case, the dissent maintained
that the personal sanctions were appropriate. 92 Accusing the ma-
jority of playing "district-court-for-a-day,"' 93 the dissent pointed
out that the Constitution itself defined the public good, and the
legislators were duty bound to uphold it.194 Once a federal court
has issued a valid order to remedy a specific constitutional viola-
tion, the remedial decrees may not be frustrated merely because
the constituents prefer to remain segregated. 9
5
Although both Spallone and Jenkins I address the limits of a dis-
trict court's involvement in local government affairs, 96 the two de-
cisions are inconsistent with one another and provide little
guidance to district courts. The view enunciated in Spallone and
restated in the Jenkins I concurrence emphasizes local autonomy,
and confers a duty upon the federal courts to determine the least
intrusive remedy.' 97 In holding that a district court may not impose
fines against legislators, 98 and in arguing that district courts can
186. Id at 279.
187. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 279.
188. Id at 280.
189. Id
190. Id. at 281.
191. Id.
192. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 297, 305.
193. Id. at 297.
194. Id. at 300-01.
195. Id at 301.
196. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 274; Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 37.
197. For an in-depth discussion of this point, see The Supreme Court, 1989 Term -
Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 296, 303 (1990).
198. Spallone, 493 U.S. at 280.
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not compel local governments to tax,199 the conservative justices
are advocating that local autonomy be respected over ensuring
compliance with a remedial order. The other view, adopted by the
Jenkins I majority and the Spallone dissent, allows a district court
to choose the remedy that it believes will vindicate the wrong even
if that remedy crosses traditional boundaries involving separation
of powers. 20 0 Finally, in Jenkins II, the Court was willing to se-
verely curtail the scope of the remedy, even in the face of "the
deep, inglorious history of segregation in Missouri. '' 20 1 Under all
three approaches, the local government must attempt to preserve
its autonomy while changing its structure to remedy the constitu-
tional violation.
C. Termination
The Supreme Court has recently begun to define the standards
to be applied by the district court in determining when and
whether a desegregation remedy can be terminated. In Board of
Education of Oklahoma v. Dowell,20 2 the Court examined a reme-
dial decree imposing a school desegregation plan that was imple-
mented in 1972.203 In 1977, finding that the school district had
achieved "unitary" status, the district court issued an order termi-
nating the case.2° In 1984, as a result of demographic changes that
caused busing to be burdensome, the school board adopted a stu-
dent reassignment plan that would allow a student to transfer from
a school where he was in the majority to a school where he was in
the minority.20 5 The plaintiffs moved to reopen the case, contend-
ing that the school had not achieved unitary status, and that the
new plan was a return to segregation.20 6 The district court refused
to reopen the case.20 7 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed the decision, holding that the 1977 order merely
ended the district court's active participation in the case, and re-
manded the case to determine whether the desegregation decree
199. Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 65.
200. Id. at 55.
201. 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
202. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
203. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 338 F. Supp. 1256, aff'd, 465 F.2d
1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972). See also Joe Hannel, The Future of
Desegregation After Dowell: Returning to Pre-Brown Days?, 56 Mo. L. REv. 1141
(1991).
204. No. Civ-9452 (W.D. Okla., Jan. 18, 1977).
205. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 242.
206. Id.
207. 606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
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should be lifted. 0 8 On remand, the district court found the follow-
ing: (i) that the school board had bussed students for over ten years
in compliance with the court's order;209 (ii) that the district had
maintained its unitary status;210 and (iii) that the neighborhood as-
signment plan was not designed with discriminatory intent.2 1 1 As a
result of these findings, the court vacated the desegregation decree
and concluded that the school district should be returned to local
control.212
The Tenth Circuit again reversed the district court's decision,
holding that a desegregation decree must remain in effect unless a
school district can show that dramatic changes in conditions led to
"extreme and unexpectedly oppressive hardships on the obli-
gor. ' 12 13 The court held that the board had an affirmative duty not
to take any action that would impede the process of destroying the
dual system.214 The Supreme Court granted certiorari so that it
may determine the standard by which a desegregation decree can
be modified or terminated.215
The Court found that the district court's 1977 order did not pre-
cisely describe when and how the desegregation plan terminated.
The Court went on to state that there was no need for the school
board to show a "grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions. ' 21 6 Instead, a finding by the district court that the
school was being operated in compliance with the Equal Protection
Clause and that the board most probably would not return to its
former ways, was sufficient to terminate an existing remedial or-
der.217 The district court must determine whether the board has
complied with the decree and whether the vestiges of past discrimi-
208. 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
209. 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1512 (W.D. Okla. 1987).
210. Id. at 1519.
211. Id. at 1516.
212. Id. at 1526.
213. 890 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989). The court relied on United States v. Swift
& Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932), for the proposition that a desegregation decree could not
be lifted absent a showing of grievous wrong evoked by new or unforeseen conditions.
Swift involved several meat-packing companies that entered into a consent decree
where they agreed, in perpetuity, to refrain from entering the grocery business. The
Supreme Court held that the circuit court's reliance on Swift was misplaced because
the language must be read in the context of the continuing danger of unlawful re-
straints on trade. 498 U.S. at 247 (citing United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968).
214. 890 F.2d at 1504.
215. 494 U.S. 1055 (1990).
216. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246.
217. Id. at 247.
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nation have been eliminated to the extent practicable. 18 In mak-
ing this determination, the court must look not only at student
assignments, but also to every aspect of school operations, includ-
ing faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities, and
facilities. 219
As to the issue of local autonomy, the Court emphasized that
federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a tem-
porary measure to remedy past discrimination and should not op-
erate in perpetuity.220 Local control over education allows citizens
to participate in decision making and allows innovation so that
school programs can fit local needs.22' Dissolving a desegregation
decree after the local authorities have acted in compliance with it
recognizes the "necessary concern for the important values of local
control of public school systems.... [A] federal court's regulatory
control of such systems [should] not extend beyond the time re-
quired to remedy the effects of past intentional discrimination. 2 2
The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision and remanded the
case to the district court to make its findings consistent with the
specific guidelines. 23
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, dis-
sented.224 Finding the standard enunciated by the majority
"vague" and "mild," the dissent maintained that the standard must
take into account the unique harm associated with a system of ra-
cially identifiable schools. 22 5 In regard to local autonomy, Justice
Marshall stated that in its concern to spare local school boards the
"draconian" fate of "indefinite judicial tutelage, 22 6 the majority
risked subordinating the constitutional rights of children to the
school board's autonomy interests. 2 7 The dissent emphasized that
local control considerations relate only to the feasibility of the re-
medial measure, not to whether the constitutional violation had
been remedied.2 8 The dissent concluded by stressing that the
218. Id. at 249-50.
219. Id. at 250.
220. Id.
221. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 251.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 267.
227. Id
228. Id.
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school districts have an unconditional duty to eliminate any condi-
tion that perpetuates racial dichotomy. 2 9
In Freeman v. Pitts,2 30 the Court once again examined the super-
vision withdrawal procedures of a district court.z3' In 1969, the
DeKalb County school system was ordered to dismantle its dual
school system. 32 In 1986, the school district petitioned for a final
dismissal.2 33 The district court relinquished remedial control as to
those aspects of the system which had achieved unitary status, but
retained supervisory authority over the areas in which the district
was not in full compliance.234 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that
a district court should retain full authority until the school board
has achieved unitary status in all categories. 235 The Supreme Court
reversed the Eleventh Circuit decision, holding that a district court
may withdraw supervision in discrete categories and need not re-
tain complete control over a school district just because it has not
achieved full unitary status.236
In coming to this conclusion, the Court stated that the duty of a
school district, once it has been found to have intentionally dis-
criminated against racial minorities, is to take all steps necessary to
eliminate the vestiges of the unconstitutional de jure system.237
The district court's purpose in intervening and formulating a de-
cree is to remedy the violation. Once a school system is operating
in compliance with the Constitution, a district court must restore
control to local authorities.238 Citing Dowell, the Court reiterated
that federal judicial supervision of local school systems was in-
tended as a temporary measure.239 Partial relinquishment of judi-
cial control, when justified by the facts of the case, is a significant
step in fulfilling the district court's duty.240 As long as the district
court applies the standard enunciated in Dowell, it has the power
to relinquish supervision of school districts in incremental stages.241
229. Id. at 268.
230. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 471.
233. Id
234. Id.
235. 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989).
236. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471.
237. Id at 485.
238. Id at 489.
239. Id
240. Id
241. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490.
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In emphasizing the importance of local autonomy, the Court
stated:
Returning schools to the control of local authorities at the earli-
est practicable date is essential to restore their true accountabil-
ity in our governmental system. When the school district and all
state entities participating with it in operating the schools make
decisions in the absence of judicial supervision, they can be held
accountable to the citizenry, to the political process, and to the
courts in the ordinary course.242
The Court emphasized that it is the duty of the state and its subdi-
visions to ensure that the potential for discrimination does not
shape the policies of its school systems.2 43 "Where control lies, so
too does responsibility. '244
In Jenkins II, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court's
determination of KCMSD's unitary status. In short, the Court held
that the district court should not consider academic goals in deter-
mining whether a school district had achieved unitary status be-
cause this examination could postpone the restoration of control to
the local government. 45 Emphasizing that the goal of the district
court is not only to remedy the violation, but to restore control to
the state and local authorities as quickly as possible, the Court
tipped the balance against judicial activism in the remedial pro-
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. Justice Scalia concurred, arguing that the presumption that any current
racial imbalance is the product of the past constitutional violation is legal theory that,
has served its usefulness, and should be abolished. Instead, there should be a rever-
sion to the ordinary principles of law: plaintiffs alleging an equal protection violation
must prove intent and causation, and not just racial disparity. Only that way can
courts begin to relinquish supervision and reinstate the democratic processes. Id. at
505-06.
Justice Souter also wrote a concurring opinion, as did Justice Blackmun, who wasjoined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor. Justice Souter elaborated on his under-
standing of the inquiry that is required by the district court in its assessment of
whether the decree can be vacated. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 507-08. Justice Blackmun,
concerned about the relationship between demographic changes and intentional seg-
regation, specified that a district court should retain jurisdiction of the school board,
even if it relinquishes supervision and control over a subpart. Further, Justice Black-
mun argued that the district court must explore the school district's influence on resi-
dential segregation, and examine whether the school board might have contributed to
it. Id. at 514.
245. 115 S. Ct. at 2056.
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cess.246 The Court pointed out that the Constitution only requires
equal opportunity, not equal results.247
The Supreme Court initially endorsed a "hands off" approach
when it articulated that "the court [should not] substitute its discre-
Lion for that of a board of education but [should] adopt a plan pro-
posed by the board if it fulfills the board's duty to eliminate the
effects of past illegal conduct. ' 248 By 1968, however, the Court be-
gan to instruct the district courts to consider school board plans "in
light of any alternatives which may be shown as feasible and more
promising in their effectiveness. '249 After the Green and Swann
decisions, most commentators agreed that the Court was adopting
a more active judicial posture.250 In Jenkins 1,251 the Court rear-
ticulated a test first announced in Milliken252 - a test which bal-
anced local interests against the vindication of constitutional
rights.253 Yet, the Court endorsed a remedial plan that included
246. Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion, concluding that the Court had the
power to look at the scope of the remedy. Id. at 2057 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
247. Id. at 2055.
248. 349 U.S. at 483. The Court in Brown II specifically stated that school authori-
ties have the primary responsibility for assessing the problem and creating the rem-
edy. Id. at 299.
249. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
250. Although the Court in Swann stated that "[r]emedial judicial authority does
not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers are ple-
nary," 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971), it observed an increasing need for activist judiciary as a
consequence of changing constitutional standards. Id. at 17-18. This active judicial
posture often takes the form of judicial selection of a remedy after receipt of sugges-
tions from all the parties. See Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976),
modified, 555 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Boston Chap-
ter NAACP v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975). Typically, the court solicits ideas and plans
from all parties involved and then either accepts one plan or creates its own out of the
various proposals. The additional plans usually come from the plaintiff. See Savile v.
Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). Others, however, may become in-
volved. See Williams v. Edward, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977) (federal government
offered alternative remedies).
Another common method of judicial involvement is the reference of formulation
issues to an expert special master. These masters are often responsible for devising
the remedy that is decreed by the court. See Connor v. Finch, 419 F. Supp. 1072 (S.D.
Miss. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Costello v. Wainwright, 397 F.
Supp. 20 (M.D. Fla. 1975), vacated and remanded, 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd
and remanded, 430 U.S. 325 (1977). For further discussion, see Special Project: The
Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 804
(1978).
251. 495 U.S. 33, 51-52 (1990).
252. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
253. Since Spallone and Jenkins I, various courts have attempted to use the guide-
lines set out by the Supreme Court. In Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir.
1991), the inmates at a mental health facility sought to have the State held in con-
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extensive capital improvements and the creation of a network of
magnet schools. 254 In Jenkins 11,255 the Court took a step away
from judicial activism, holding that a district court must restore
control of a school system to the local authorities if it is operating
in compliance with the Constitution.
The Court has also restricted the district court's power to en-
force its remedial orders even in the face of a clearly recalcitrant
defendant. 6 In recent cases concerning the dissolution of reme-
dial orders, the Court strongly emphasized the importance of local
autonomy, holding in Freeman v. Pitts that judicial supervision can
be relinquished even when full unitary status has not been
achieved.2 57 The Court noted that the district court may terminate
its oversight when it finds that the school district is operating in
compliance with the Constitution, and that it is unlikely to return
to its former ways.258 The Court continued this trend in Jenkins II,
when it held that the district court's end purpose is to restore con-
tempt for violating a consent decree that governed conditions at the facility. The
district court denied the relief, and the First Circuit affirmed. The court cited Jenkins
I and Spallone to emphasize that intervention into the affairs of state and local gov-
ernments must be conducted with the understanding that the autonomy of these gov-
ernments should be safeguarded to the maximum extent possible. Id. at 1221. The
court used Spallone as an example where the district court had overstepped its power.
Id. at 1222. Because the district court's record was "dotted with examples of judicial
restraint cast in precisely the mold configured by the Spallone Court," id., its determi-
nation not to find contempt was treated with deference and affirmed. See also United
States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 902 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Jenkins I for the
proposition that a federal district court may order almost anything it wants in order to
remedy past discrimination); United States v. Metro. Dist. Comm., 930 F.2d 132, 136
(1st Cir. 1991) (citing Spallone for the limits of comity and federalism).
254. The argument that the Jenkins I decision infringed on local autonomy is with-
out merit. The Missouri State Constitution specifically provided that taxes could not
be increased by the local government without direct voter approval. Jenkins I, 495
U.S. at 64. In Jenkins I, the Missouri Constitution provided that the taxing power may
be exercised ... by counties and other political subdivisions under power granted to
them by the general assembly. Id. The only state constitutional provision that
granted the locality authority to levy property taxes also limited this power to $1.25
per $100 of assessed value unless an increase was approved by the local constituents.
Id. Thus, under existing state law, KCMSD had no authority to raise the property tax
over $1.25 without voter approval. Id. By enjoining this provision, the district court
enjoined the provision that granted the locality the power to tax. Id. at 64-65. Elimi-
nating state law limitations on a school district's taxing authority did not create a
"perversion of the normal legislative process." Id. at 71. Although this may infringe
on state autonomy, the Court is allowing the local government the power to raise the
revenue needed to finance the remedy.
255. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
256. 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
257. 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992).
258. Id. at 489-90.
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trol of the school system to the state and local school authorities
even if academic achievement is clearly not compatible with other
schools in the district.259
Although the Court mentions local autonomy in all its recent
desegregation opinions,260 it has consistently failed to assert the im-
portance of local autonomy in fashioning remedial orders. The city
continues to sway, pulled on one side by the need for change in
deeply entrenched patterns of behavior, and on the other by the
need for local autonomy and control. In order to achieve the dual
goals of desegregation, the Court must articulate what it means by
local autonomy and where it belongs in the remedial process.
IV. Local Governmental Autonomy at Crossroads: The Need
for a Definition of What It Means and Where It
Applies
The Court's view that local autonomy is equally important in
each phase of the remedial process only hinders the overall pro-
cess. To achieve the dual goal of redressing the constitutional infir-
mity as quickly as possible while maintaining the integrity of the
local government, the Court should stress local autonomy only in
the creation of the remedy. By emphasizing local autonomy in the
formulation phase, the Court ensures a successful and feasible rem-
edy. Once a city has failed to comply with a remedial order, local
autonomy should no longer be a factor. Similarly, the determina-
tion of whether a school district has achieved unitary status is a
question of law in which local autonomy should not play a part.
This approach prevents a scenario where a city is forced to institute
sweeping changes when it does not have the ability to finance those
changes. It also ensures that the district court has the power to
enforce compliance until the vestiges of discrimination have been
eliminated.
Once liability has been determined, the duty of the district court
is to guarantee that school districts "eliminate the discriminatory
effects of the past as well as [to] bar like discrimination in the fu-
ture. '' 261 The obligation of segregated school districts is to come
forward with a plan that "promises realistically to work, and
259. 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
260. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490 ("As we have long observed, 'local autonomy of
school districts is a vital national tradition.' " (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
man, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977))); Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2054 ("[O]ur cases recognize
that local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition.").
261. Green. 391 U.S. at 438 n.4.
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promises realistically to work now."2 62 This is an affirmative obli-
gation, born out of the realization that "the time for mere 'deliber-
ate speed' has run out. ' 263 Thus, a desegregation remedy must
attain two distinct goals. First, the formulation process must pro-
duce a viable plan that specifically addresses the constitutional vio-
lation.2M Second, the plan must be implemented as quickly as
possible.265 An emphasis on the importance of local autonomy in
the formulation phase would foster these dual goals.
A. Formation of Remedy
The nature of relief in institutional reform litigation places the
courts in a new role.266 During the formulation phase, the court
becomes responsible for implementing broad reforms in situations
where the disputes are often accompanied by political ambivalence
and social dissension.267 In many instances, the court learns of the
problems involved in the dispute from information gathered in an
adversarial setting.268 Regardless of the court's involvement, the
local government must ultimately destroy the vestiges of discrimi-
nation. Because of the complexity surrounding institutional reform
litigation, the best way to successfully maintain local autonomy
while curing the constitutional violation is to impose a court-over-
seen Alternative Dispute Resolution.z69
This approach has many advantages. First, a remedy developed
and proposed by the local government has the greatest chance of
success.270 The local government has the resources to develop the
262. Id. at 439.
263. Id. at 438 (quoting Griffin v. Prince Edward County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234
(1964)).
264. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) ("The
nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.").
265. See Davis v. Bd. of School Comm. of Mobile Co., 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) ("The
measure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness.").
266. See Chayes, supra note 72.
267. For a good discussion of these problems in the area of mental health reform,
see Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 428 (1977).
268. In formulating a remedy, the court derives its knowledge of the institution
from information presented during the adversarial process. Because this information
may not be completely accurate, the court may not be aware of the political or organi-
zational realities of the institution.
269. The policy in federal court favoring the voluntary resolution of litigation
through settlement is particularly strong in the class action context. See, e.g., White v.
National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1416 (D. Minn. 1993).
270. See, e.g., Hart v. Community Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd,
512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 339 F. Supp.
1315, 1321 (N.D. Cal. 1971), vacated and remanded, 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974);
698
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plan and can deal with the intricacies of school operation by includ-
ing educational components in the plan that are beyond the com-
petence of the court.271 Second, this method minimizes intrusions
into the affairs of local governments.272 Third, allowing a munici-
pality to create the plan greatly aids in the enforcement of such a
plan by reducing the risk of non-compliance. Finally, active partici-
pation by the local government at the outset ensures a smoother
restoration of control to the school board following the judicial su-
pervision.273 Under this approach, the district court would invite
broad participation of all parties with an interest in the remedy. In
addition to the parties involved in the litigation, neighborhood as-
sociations, parent groups, and other civic organizations would be
encouraged to participate in the process. 274 The local government
would be given every opportunity to create a viable plan. If the
court rejects a plan submitted by the local government, the rejec-
tion should be accompanied by specific reasons. The court's role
should be limited to deciding whether the result achieved by the
plan satisfies constitutional criteria.
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1972). One school board
attorney has suggested that if plaintiffs "adopt a less confrontational attitude towards
school boards ... in many cases effective compromises would be reached which in the
long run would be more effective than they would have been had the plaintiffs suc-
ceeded in implementing their own plan." Alfred A. Lindseth, A Different Perspective:
A Local School Board Attorney's Viewpoint, 42 EMORY L.J. 879, 887 (1993).
271. See Lindseth, supra note 270, at 887.
272. See, e.g., Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1026 (E.D. Pa.
1976), aff'd in part, modified, and vacated in part, 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978) ("[The court] does [not] intend to appropriate the role of
the legislative bodies whose proper function it is to ... establish local policy"); Brad-
ley v. Sch. Bd., 325 F. Supp. 828, 832-33 (E.D. Va. 1971) (noting that it is the "[s]chool
board's duty to run the schools"); Connor v. Johnson, 256 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D.
Miss. 1966) ("[We] trust that such a vital legislative function will never have to be
performed by the judiciary, state or federal."), aff'd, 386 U.S. 483 (1967); see gener-
ally, Hawkins, 437 F.2d at 1294 (Bell, J., concurring).
273. One of the prerequisites to relinquishment of court control over schools is that
a school district has demonstrated its commitment to a cause of action that gives full
respect to the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Freeman, 503 U.S. at
490.
274. Extensive participation can diminish the adversarial nature and enhance the
likelihood of compliance. Organizations are prone to respond negatively to change
imposed from the outside. Increased participation in decree formulation can make
the change appear to be self-generated rather than externally imposed. See Mills v.
Bd. of Educ. of Dist. of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
Participation may also raise policy and implementation factors that were over-
looked by the plaintiff and defendant and can help shape the decree. See Chayes,
supra note 72, at 440.
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The success of a plan which emphasizes local government in-
volvement depends on the good faith of the municipality.2" The
court's focus, however, should not be on whether the local govern-
ment can be trusted, but rather whether the judiciary could create
a more successful plan. In the event that the local government is
unable to create a viable plan, the district court should take a more
active part in the formulation of the remedy. 76 In creating the
remedy, however, the district court should explore all alternatives,
and articulate why those rejected remedies were not chosen. Areas
of inquiry by the district court should include: (i) whether the re-
medial decree intrudes on the legislative function of the locality;
(ii) whether the remedial order exceeds the statutory authority al-
located to the locality by the state; and (iii) whether the locality has
the resources available to implement the decree. 77
275. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("Nor
need we enquire.., whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
276. Indeed, when the school authorities default in their obligations to offer an
acceptable remedy, the district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will
assure a unitary school system. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300
F. Supp. 1381, 1382-83 (W.D.N.C. 1969), for example, the district court gave the de-
fendants ample opportunity to produce a plan but had not obtained an acceptable
plan after six years of litigation. Although the school board directed the superinten-
dent to prepare a plan, the superintendent prepared a "minimal" plan, that was fur-
ther pared down by the board before submission to the court. Finally, the district
court ordered a plan developed by a court-appointed consultant which finally pushed
the defendants into creating an acceptable plan. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265, 266 (W.D.N.C.), vacated and remanded, 431 F.2d 138
(4th Cir. 1970) (hearings in response to defendant's fourth opportunity to present
plans); see also Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 1102,
1103 (W.D.N.C. 1974), aff'd, 501 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1974).
Similarly, in the Yonkers litigation the court initially ordered relief in 1986, but the
city balked at the housing remedy order resulting in the contempt sanctions ordered
by the district court in 1988. In both of these instances the court's remedial powers
were necessary to ensure and effectuate constitutional rights. If local authorities are
stagnant, the courts become the only avenue where those discriminated against can
obtain a remedy.
277. The dispute in Jenkins I arose because the locality did not have enough re-
sources to fund the elaborate plan approved by the district court. With greater partic-
ipation by the locality, the people have the opportunity to modify the desegregation
plan to reflect the collective will of the taxpayers. It would be better to reduce the
plan to a level that can accomplish the goals at a more reasonable price. As the
Supreme Court has held, desegregation decrees must be reasonable, feasible, worka-
ble, effective and realistic. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
31 (1970).
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B. Enforcement of Remedy
Local autonomy should not be a consideration in the enforce-
ment phase of the remedial process. A remedial order is useless if
the institution fails to comply. Therefore, district courts must be
given broad enforcement power. Without the power to guarantee
compliance, a negotiated settlement is meaningless. It is essential
for the court to be able to impose sanctions for disobedience.278
The Spallone decision, where the Court held that the district
court's order of contempt against the council members was an
abuse of discretion under traditional equitable principles, raises se-
rious doubts regarding the utility of negotiated settlements. The
district courts' intimate contact with civil rights cases equips them
with special insights into various methods of coercing compliance
when all cooperative measures have failed. District courts are bet-
ter able to determine which sanctions are most likely to work
quickly and effectively.
The Spallone dissent, written by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, recognized that the dis-
trict court had "weathered a whirlwind of evasive maneuvers and
misrepresentations,... considered and rejected alternative means
of securing compliance other than contempt sanctions; and care-
fully considered the ramifications of personal fines. ' 279 In arguing
that the district court did not abuse its discretion, the dissent em-
phasized that the decision sends a message to district courts that
despite their close contact with the parties and issues, their choices
are subject to being second-guessed by a higher court. Justice
Brennan astutely observed in the last paragraph of his opinion, "[I]
worry that the Court's message will have the unintended effect of
emboldening recalcitrant officials continually to test the ultimate
reach of the remedial authority of the federal courts ... "280
For desegregation remedies to be effective, the Supreme Court
must furnish the district courts with broad enforcement powers so
that it may ensure compliance. This power does not infringe on the
autonomy of the local government; instead it prohibits the local
government from defying court orders merely because the inhabit-
ants prefer to remain segregated. Local autonomy is preserved by
the active role the local government plays in designing the scope
and content of the underlying order. Once that order has been
278. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
279. 493 U.S. 265, 292 (1990).
280. Id. at 306.
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designed, the defendants must implement it or face the
consequences.
C. Modification or Termination of Remedy
Finally, the Court's recent emphasis on the importance of local
autonomy in the dissolution phase of the remedial process is mis-
placed. The Court's concern that judicial supervision of school sys-
tems be intended as a temporary measure is laudable;281 however, a
court should terminate its remedial jurisdiction only when it finds
that the violation no longer exists. A local government is not in the
position to determine whether a school is being operated in com-
pliance with the equal protection clause. More importantly, the
goal of returning school systems to local control should not super-
sede the constitutional rights of children. As cautioned by Justice
Marshall in his dissent in Dowell:
[D]issolving a desegregation plan when it is unlikely that a
school board will return to its former ways fails to recognize the
unique harm associated with a system of racially identifiable
schools, and the ability of the vestiges of segregation to survive
for a long, long time.28 2
V. Applying the New Standard to Kansas City
While many school systems in the United States have desegrega-
tion plans that are under the supervision of the federal courts, the
plan established in Missouri v. Jenkins is one of the most controver-
sial and expensive in the nation. Issues involving the scope, en-
forcement, and termination of the remedial order have been in
front of the Supreme Court in two separate lawsuits.283 Thus, this
ongoing dispute provides a good setting for the application of the
principles set forth in the preceding section.
The remedy formulation phase in Kansas City was unique in a
variety of aspects. First, unlike in most desegregation lawsuits, the
school district-the Kansas City School Board-was originally a
281. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977). See Board of
Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) ("[Fjrom the
very first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary
measure to remedy past discrimination."); Millikin v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741
(1974)("No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local con-
trol over the operation of schools."); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249 ("No one's interest is
furthered by subjecting the nation's educational system to judicial tutelage for the
indefinite future.").
282. 498 U.S. at 257.
283. 495 U.S. 33 (1990); 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
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plaintiff in the action. Although it was realigned as a defendant, it
continued to be a "friendly adversary" in the proceedings.2 4
Rather than being a recalcitrant defendant, it was an active partici-
pant in the remedy formulation. Although the school board was a
willing and active participant, the State of Missouri was not.2 s5
284. Jenkins H, 115 S. Ct. at 2044.
285. Throughout the remedial phase of the litigation, the KCMSD proposed ever
more expensive improvements with the agreement of the plaintiffs, and the State ob-
jected. The district court rejected various proposals by the State to make capital im-
provements because the "patch and repair" approach proposed by the State would
not achieve suburban comparability. Instead, the district court approved new con-
struction and a large scale magnet school program. Jenkins I, 495 U.S. at 59 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
In many cases, an additional problem in funding arises because the state is not a
defendant in the action. For example, in 1993, the Yonkers Board of Education and
the NAACP brought a new proceeding in district court, alleging that although the
Yonkers public schools were no longer racially identifiable, the vestiges of segregation
had not been eliminated. United States v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp. 214
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). The board of education asserted that the failure to adequately ad-
dress these vestiges of segregation did not result from a lack of commitment on the
part of the school system, but rather from the lack of funds. Id. at 217. The board of
education therefore instituted proceedings against the State of New York, seeking to
impose a fiscal responsibility on the state. Id.
The court determined that two separate issues needed to be resolved: first, whether
inadequately addressed vestiges remained in the Yonkers school system; second,
whether the state should be fiscally responsible. Id. The court limited its discussion
to whether vestiges of prior discrimination continued to exist in Yonkers, leaving
open the question of what entities should share fiscal responsibility if vestiges re-
mained. Id. at 218. After twelve days of testimony, the court concluded that vestiges
of segregation remained in the Yonkers public school system, and although steps were
being taken to address these vestiges, the steps were inadequate. Id. at 225. The
expansion and implementation of these steps would necessarily entail additional
funds. The court emphasized that it did not address issues relating to the state's liabil-
ity for the existence of these issues, or the relative fiscal responsibility of the city and
state. Id.
In March, 1995, the court held that the State of New York was not liable for the
segregated status of the Yonkers public schools and was therefore not responsible for
supplying the additional funds to remedy the violation. United States v. City of Yon-
kers, 880 F. Supp. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The court reluctantly concluded that liability
could not be imposed on the state because of a Second Circuit case holding that
although the state has the power and duty to address segregation, if the state does not
affirmatively participate in local pro-segregative conduct, liability cannot be imposed
under § 1983. Mere knowledge of a wrongdoing is insufficient for § 1983 liability;
there needs to be evidence that local and state officials conspired to thwart desegrega-
tion policies, or that the state supported the conduct of the local officials. Id. at 236.
Even though there was evidence that the state was aware of the segregation in the
Yonkers public schools and that the state had the power and authority to deal with the
problem and chose not to do so because of political pressures, liability cannot be
imposed. Id. Thus, the state is insulated from liability and the city of Yonkers must
bear the financial burden.
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Second, the remedy itself was extravagant.286 Because the Court
did not find interdistrict liability, 87 there could be no interdistrict
relief.2 88 The district court, however, ordered the school district to
make the school system so attractive that suburban children would
voluntarily transfer to its schools. 289 To satisfy this goal, the rem-
edy included air conditioning in all the classrooms;
an alarm system, and 15 microcomputers; a 2,000-square-foot
planetarium; greenhouses and vivariums; a 25-acre farm with an
air-conditioned meeting room for 104 people; a Model United
Nations wired for language translation; broadcast capable radio
and television studios with an editing and animation lab; a tem-
perature controlled art gallery;... swimming pools; and numer-
ous other facilities.29°
When this lavish plan reached the Supreme Court, it concluded
that the district court had allowed the school board to dream, and
"provided the mechanism for those dreams to be realized."'291
An approach emphasizing court-overseen Alternative Dispute
Resolution would have yielded a better result. Had the district
court been more cognizant of the various interests of the parties
during the formulation phase, the unnecessary expense could have
been avoided. Additional discussion by the state and community
members would have either yielded less opposition to the final ex-
pensive plan, or perhaps resulted in the formulation of a different
286. As the Eighth Circuit judges dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc put
it: "The remedies ordered go far beyond anything previously seen in a school deseg-
regation case. The sheer immensity of the programs encompassed by the district
court's order-the large number of magnet schools and the quantity of capital reno-
vations and new construction-are concededly without parallel in any other school
district in the country." 855 F.2d at 1318-19.
287. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2051.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 2041.
290. 495 U.S. 33, 76 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
291. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2045 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. A-133). The opin-
ion itself has led to conflicting appraisals from the community. As one commentator
stated: "The decision to restrain Judge Clark is one more sign that the nation is escap-
ing from the intellectual dead end of solving social problems-including the most
intractable ones, regarding race-by allowing judges to bend the Constitution to the
service of their political agendas." George F. Will, The Last Word: From Topeka to
Kansas, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1995, at 66. Another commentator espoused a different
view: "As a nation we are going to have to face the tragedy of those schools in the
cities that don't function .... The problems can't be solved by the cities themselves,
and the state and federal government and now the courts are saying they have no
stomach for solving it either." Juan Williams, The Court's Other Bombshell; Schools,
Not Voting Rights, Was the Key Racial Ruling, WASH. POST, July 2, 1995, Outlook, at
C1.
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plan that respected the wishes of the community instead of the dis-
trict court.292
Once a plan has been approved by the court, local autonomy
interests should not infringe on the need to enforce the remedial
order. In Jenkins, a problem arose with funding the plan. Total
292. The district court in the Yonkers decision had the formidable task of creating
two remedies: one for the discrimination in housing and one for the discrimination in
schools. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (S.D.N.Y.
1985). Although there were strong efforts at resolving the "schools" portion of the
lawsuit, the efforts eventually failed. After the court found intentional segregation in
November, 1985, it requested the city officials to propose remedies to move towards
integration. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. at 1540 (S.D.N.Y.
1986). The plaintiffs, the Justice Department and the NAACP, found the plans inade-
quate and proposed further modifications. Id. The district court's final remedial or-
der represented the thoughts of both parties. It included extensive redistricting,
closing some schools, and developing "magnet schools" that would offer enriched aca-
demic programs. Id at 1540-41. The plan went into effect in September, 1986, and
was successful, largely because of voluntary compliance by the parents and the com-
munity. As a result of good faith and zealous implementation of the remedial order
by the board of education, the racial separation of students in the Yonkers public
schools has nearly ended. The transition took place peacefully, without disturbances
and disruption.
Although the racial segregation of students in the Yonkers public schools has nearly
ended, Yonkers continues to be engaged in a bitter and divisive effort to thwart the
court's orders to remedy racial discrimination with respect to housing. Creating an
effective remedy for housing discrimination is both similar and different from creating
school discrimination remedies. Housing remedies are frequently met with even a
higher level of resistance than school desegregation remedies. As one resident stated,
"there are questions on the mixing of people of disparate economic classes." Resi-
dents are concerned about decreasing property values, graffiti in their neighborhoods,
crowds, and traffic. Once the housing is built, there is little true mingling among
adults, although there is some evidence of children playing with each other. Unlike
busing programs or the creation of magnet schools, that once initiated can carry out
the desired goal, housing requires a commitment to implementation that must be
ongoing. Non-minority residents, who have traditionally controlled political mecha-
nisms, successfully avoid placing public housing in their own neighborhoods. Because
the eradication of residential segregation requires such a long-term commitment, and
goes to the heart of the needs of city dwellers, emphasizing a consensual agreement
becomes even more important.
The success of the school integration as compared with the continued problems
with housing integration demonstrates the importance of emphasizing a consensual
agreement between the parties. The school desegregation order, although not a con-
sent decree, reflected ideas from both the defendant board of education and the
plaintiffs. The community members felt as if they had input into the decision-making
process, and were not being forced to change their lifestyle. The housing order, on
the other hand, was met with virulent opposition. The refusal of the council members
to go along with the court order was based on their perception of the opposition of
their constituents. A consent decree allows open discussion early on in the process. It
gives the local authorities input and control over the programs.
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desegregation costs approached $200 million per year.293  The
school district lacked the funds to comply, and the electorate was
neither willing to remove state law restrictions on the school dis-
trict's power to tax, nor approve the school district's proposals for
tax increases or bond issues.294 The district court chose to enforce
its remedial order by circumventing the Missouri State Constitu-
tion and imposed taxes on the city's constituents.295 Once the plan
was created, the district court needed to devise a solution to the
funding problem. The resulting order imposed a substantial finan-
cial burden on the taxpayers. Although the enforcement mecha-
nism arguably infringed on local autonomy, the court must be
given the flexibility to impose whatever sanctions it deems neces-
sary to ensure compliance.
Finally, contrary to the Supreme Court's current view, considera-
tion of local autonomy has no place in the dissolution phase of in-
stitutional reform. Although education may be a vital local
tradition, it remains the gateway to opportunity, self-sufficiency,
economic success, and political participation. A school desegrega-
tion decree should not be dissolved until the purposes of the decree
have been fully achieved. Local control relates to the feasibility of
a remedial measure, not to whether the constitutional violation has
been remedied.296
In its haste to return school districts to local control, the Jenkins
Court ignored the need to fully integrate every aspect of the school
system. Although there has been some progress in desegregating
the Kansas City schools, academic achievement at those schools is
still below national norms.2 97 The percentage of minority students
in the schools has increased, not decreased, since the plan was im-
plemented. 298 "The transition to a unitary, nonracial system of
public education was and is the ultimate end to be brought
about. ' 299 As Justice Marshall stated in the Dowell dissent, a ves-
tige of segregation "extends to any condition that is likely to con-
293. 115 S. Ct. at 2044. Given the cost, it is not surprising that the district court
thought it was advisable to order the hiring of a "public-information specialist" to sell
the plan to the community. 639 F. Supp. at 41.
294. La Pierre, supra note 30, at 303.
295. Id. at 334-35.
296. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 267
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
297. Missouri v. Jenkins, 11 F.3d 755, 761-62 (8th Cir. 1993).
298. Laura Scott, Better KCK Schools, KAN. CITY STAR, Feb. 12, 1996, Opinion, at
C6.
299. Green v. Country Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968).
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vey the message of inferiority implicit in a policy of segregation. ''30 0
The effects of discrimination remain chargeable to the school dis-
trict, and a remedial decree is required until those effects are com-
pletely eliminated.°' These considerations have nothing to do
with local autonomy.
VI. Conclusion
Segregation in our schools remains prevalent. Municipalities are
often the source, of constitutional violations; yet, without the coop-
eration of the municipality and its constituents, a remedy cannot be
successful. The United States Supreme Court in addressing this di-
lemma recently concluded that the courts must respect the integrity
of the municipality while correcting any constitutional violations.
The cases, however, provide little guidance to the district courts on
how this balance is to be maintained. In fact, the decisions them-
selves are inconsistent due to the differing views of the judges on
the role of the municipality in our government.
These cases challenge the courts to reexamine the importance of
local autonomy in the context of institutional reform. It is critical
that the law provide a clear guideline on what part local autonomy
is to play in the different phases of institutional reform. Local au-
tonomy should be an integral consideration in formulating a proper
remedy. To protect the local government's integrity, greater defer-
ence must be given to the municipality in creating the order. Even
though the municipality is often responsible for the constitutional
violation, its knowledge of school operations and needs of its in-
habitants puts it in a better position than a court in formulating a
remedy. Once the specific remedy is ordered, the district court
must be given the power to enforce its remedial orders. Allowing a
municipality to participate in the beginning stages of the remedial
process protects local autonomy, while broad enforcement powers
guarantee compliance with the order. Finally, local autonomy
should not play a role in the decision to terminate the remedial
order. Although it is important to return control of education to
the locality as quickly as possible, this should not outweigh the im-
portance of eradicating the violation.
The city continues to sway, unsure of its role in institutional re-
form litigation. The Court must not blindly protect the power of
the federal government or the autonomy of the local government
300. 498 U.S. at 260-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
301. Id.
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at the expense providing an effective resolution. When the Court
accomplishes this feat, the city will cease to sway and the lingering
effects of segregation will be eliminated. Life over the abyss will be
a bit more stable than before.
